MetLife Capital - The Uncertain Fate of Default
Rate and Late Fee Provisions
LaurenceM. Smith, Esq. *
In MetLife CapitalFinancialCorp. v. Washington Avenue Associates,'
a New Jersey appellate court held unenforceable a late fee fixed as a
percentage of the delinquent installment and a default rate that exceeds by 3% the interest rate otherwise in effect under the note. On
one level, the decision can be viewed as the just deserts for an overreaching lender and as an admonition to all other lenders against
engaging in the egregious conduct of which MetLife was guilty. As
legal precedent, which will impact most existing and future commercial lending relationships, the holding is troubling.
MetLife involved a four-year, $1.5 million mortgage loan bearing
interest at an annual rate of 9.55% and which provided for monthly
installments each in the amount of $14,030.983 At maturity, a balloon payment in the amount of $1,391,236.90 was due. The note
evidencing the loan provided for a late charge of 5% of the delinquent installment if any payment was more than ten days past due
and a default rate of interest equal to the greater of 15% per annum
or 5% in excess of the prime rate designated by The Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.5
The defendants made all forty-eight required monthly installments, forty of which were delinquent, but failed to make the balloon
payment at maturity. 6 MetLife, therefore, instituted a foreclosure action and exercised its right, under the assignment of leases that also
secured the loan, to collect rental directly from the tenant at the
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mortgaged property.7 In the suit, MetLife originally sought late fees
not only for the forty delinquent monthly installments, but also for
the approximately $1.4.million balance remaining at maturity; this
latter claim, totaling almost $69,000, was eventually withdrawn by
MetLife. MetLife assessed interest at the 15% default rate and, in
calculating the amount due, apparently applied the default rate
commencing one month before the loan was in default.9 Lastly,
MetLife asserted a claim to recover the amounts it had advanced for
real estate taxes subsequent to the default, together with interest on
those advances.'0 Significantly, MetLife found it necessary to advance
funds to pay the real estate taxes even though, during the ten-month
period in question, MetLife had collected $188,615.50 in rental under the assignment of leases." The explanation for this anomaly was
that MetLife had not applied the rentals toward the real estate taxes
on the property or toward any of the defendant's other obligations,
choosing instead to use those amounts for its own purposes and to
credit the defendants with the entire $188,615.50
2 at or about the
time MetLife filed its certification of amount due.
TRIAL COURT RULING

The matter proceeded as an uncontested foreclosure action,
subject to an evidential hearing to determine the reasonableness of
the late fee and the default rate of interest."s Testifying on behalf of
MetLife was an investment portfolio manager." She stated that, as a
result of late payments, calls are typically made and letters sent to the
borrower, reporting and monitoring requirements are triggered,
and, presumably, senior management uses the reports generated
from these efforts to determine whether to commence litigation or
utilize other enforcement techniques.' 5 The expert observed further
that the 5% late charge was the industry standard and custom.' 6 After
considering this testimony and the countervailing testimony of the
defendant's expert, a bank loan officer, the trial court sustained the
late charge as reasonable liquidated damages, but held that a default
7
8
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rate of 15% per annum was in the nature of a penalty.17 The trial
court ruled that a default rate of 12.55%, 3% above the rate otherwise in
effect under the note, was reasonably related to actual dam18
ages.
DECISION ON APPFAL

The appellate division reversed the trial court's rulings regarding the late fee and the default rate. 9 Determining that both provisions constituted liquidated damages provisions, the appellate court
applied the two-prong test promulgated in Westmount Country Club v.
Kamen ° to assess whether they were enforceable.' Under the Westmount Country Club test, for liquidated damages to be sustained "(a)
the amount so fixed [must be] a reasonable forecast of just compensation for the harm that is caused by the breach, and (b) the harm
that is caused by the breach [must be] one that is incapable or very
difficult of accurate estimate. 22 As the late charge at issue in MetLife
was a fixed percentage of the delinquent installment, without regard
to the amount of the installment or the number of days it was late,
the court concluded that it could not possibly be a reasonable estimate of the administrative costs sustained by MetLife each time a
payment was late. 3 The court noted that, "to the extent that these
administrative internal costs represent recoverable damages at all, a
reasonable liquidated damages provision would have to be in the nature of a flat fee that would be the same for all borrowers.,2 4 However, the
court did admit of the possibility that a late fee could vary based
25
upon the frequency and duration of the delinquencies.
The appellate court likewise concluded that the default rate,
even as reduced by the trial court to 3% above the contract rate, was
a penalty and could not be sustained.26 Evaluating the testimony of
MetLife's expert regarding internal administrative costs resulting
from the occurrence of a default, the court concluded that the 3%
See id. at 531, 713 A.2d at 530.
See id.
19 See MetLife, 313 N.J. Super. at 545, 713 A.2d at 537-38.
20 82 N.J. Super. 200, 197 A.2d 379 (App. Div. 1964).
2
See MetLife, 313 N.J. Super. at 537, 713 A.2d at 533 (citing Westmount Country
Club, 82 N.J. Super. at 206, 197 A.2d at 382).
22 Id. at 537, 713 A.2d at 533 (quoting Westmount Country Club, 82 N.J. Super. at
206, 197 A.2d at 382).
23 See id.
24 Id. at 541, 713 A.2d at 535 (emphasis added).
25 See id.
26 See id. at 544-45, 713 A.2d at 537.
17
18
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default rate approved by the trial court was not reasonably related to
the damages suffered by MetLife. The appellate court therefore vacated the provisions of the judgment of foreclosure allowing the 5%
late charge and the 12.55% default rate of interest, and remanded
the case to the trial court with instructions to allow MetLife to presdamages sustained by virtue of the late payments
ent proof of actual
2
and the default.

AN ACTrMIST COURT

Based upon the appellate court's ruling, the only way MetLife
could receive a fee for the late payments would be to establish the actual damages it sustained.2 If MetLife is able to do so, that raises the
specter that all late charges should be struck down on the theory that
actual damages can be proved with precision and without the attendant difficulties that would justify liquidated damages. Although
stopping short of that perilous conclusion, the MetLife court seemed
receptive to that possibility, ruling that "at least some of the legitimate elements of damage are not either unascertainable or difficult
to calculate.""° Alarmingly, support for the court's position came not
from the trial record, but rather from the court's gratuitous observation that the late charge was intended to compensate MetLife for the
opportunity cost of receiving payments in an untimely fashion.3 '
Similarly, the court's conclusions, (i) that coercion was one intended
purpose of the late charge, and (ii) that MetLife's internal administrative costs were directly related to the duration and frequency of
the delinquencies, were not drawn from testimony adduced at trial
but were inferences made by the court.3 2 That the decision was
grounded in part in the court's unsubstantiated views of commercial
lending is an aggressive exercise ofjudicial license.
Equally flawed is the court's holding that a late charge should be
the same for all borrowers. It should have occurred to the court that
larger loans constitute a more significant portion of a lender's portfolio and therefore may command more attention than do smaller
loans. Assuming that proposition is correct, it follows that a delinquent payment on a $10 million loan may engender more concern
and costs than a delinquent payment on a $100,000 loan. Further,
See MetLife, 313 N.J. Super. at 545, 713 A.2d at 537.
See id., 713 A.2d at 537-38.
7. See id., 713 A.2d at 538.
s0 Id. at 542, 713 A.2d at 536.
51 See id. at 540, 713 A.2d at 535.
32 See id. at 541-42, 713 A.2d
at 535-36.
27

28
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different types of loans, by their nature, require varying degrees of
oversight and administration; it is not difficult to conceive that a delinquent payment under a mortgage loan may occasion fewer administrative costs than a late payment under a fully monitored, assetbased revolving line of credit with daily reporting of sales and collections. Admitting of these possibilities would militate against the type
of per se rule that the court fashioned in MetLife.
Another troubling facet of the MetLife decision is that the court
never ruled on the enforceability of the actual late fee assessed
against the borrower. In striking down the late fee provision, the
court noted that "the same [5%] applies whether the late installment
was $1,000 or $10,000 or $100,000...

.""

However, the installment

at issue in the MetLife case was not $1,000, $10,000, or $100,000 and
did not vary over time; the monthly installment was fixed at
$14,030.98 and the late charge, in turn, was fixed at $701.55. Why
did the court not rule on the enforceability of that amount as liquidated damages? By hypothesizing about the late fee under circumstances that were not germane to the case, the court promulgated a
rule that would also invalidate a late charge equal to one-quarter of
1% of the monthly installment - an amount equal to approximately
$35 in the MetLife case. Stated simply, the MetLife court should have
limited its holding to the facts before it, thereby accomplishing justice between the parties and providing guidance to all lenders, without unnecessarily undermining a long-standing industry practice.
MISPLACED RELIANCE

In summary fashion, the appellate division also struck down the
default rate on the basis that it could not pass the two-prong test applicable to liquidated damages provisions. The court explained, "On
this record, we regard as entirely speculative the conclusion that any
unascertainable or difficult to calculate actual damages suffered by
MetLife by reason of the default are reasonably related to a 3% enhancement over the contract rate.''3 4 Contrary to the court's reasoning,
a default rate is in fact a contractual rate of interest; it is the rate that
takes effect from and after the occurrence of an event of default.
Loans frequently provide for interest rates to change based upon
specific events, such as a borrower's achieving earnings milestones or
merely the passage of time. Why, then, did the court in MetLife hold

33
34

MetLife, 313 N.J. Super. at 539, 713 A.2d at 534.
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that the occurrence of an event of default was an impermissible basis
for triggering a change in the interest rate?
In striking down the default rate, the court in MetLife blindly applied the liquidated damages test promulgated in Westmount Country
Club.3 5 However, Westmount County Club was a suit to collect annual
dues by a country club and is too factually dissimilar to serve as useful
precedent in MetLife. What the MetLife court should have done was
examine more closely, and place greater reliance upon, the holding
in Stuchin v. Kasirer." Stuchin was an appeal from a foreclosure judgment upholding a post-default interest rate of 15% in excess of the
contract rate of 9%. 3 Although the Stuchin court cited the two-prong

test from Westmount Country Club, it relied primarily upon precedent
analyzing default rates under loans.3 9 In one case, Feller v. Architects
Display Buildings, Inc.,4 the interest rate increased from 17% to
32.87%,"' and in another case, Spiotta v. William H. Wilson, Inc.,42 the
default rate constituted an 8.58% increase in the interest rate.43 In
each of those decisions, the court held the default rate
"unconscionable and unenforceable as a penalty.",44 In light of the
principles espoused in Feller and Spiotta, the Stuchin court remanded
the matter to the trial court to reconsider whether the 15% increase
was penal in nature. 5 Should the 3% increase upheld by the trial
court in MetLife have been viewed in the same vein as the foregoing
increases, which ranged from approximately 8.5% to 15%? If not,
then MetLife represents a radical departure from prior case law addressing the issue.
THE LENDER'S RESPONSE

Unless modified or overturned by the New Jersey Supreme
Court, the MetLife decision represents the current state of the law and
55 See id. at 537, 713 A.2d at 533 (citing Westmount
Country Club v. Kameny, 82
N.J. Super. 200, 197 A.2d 379 (App. Div. 1964)).
See Westmount Country Club, 82 N.J. Super. at 202-03, 197 A.2d at 380-81.
37 237 N.J. Super. 604, 568 A.2d 907 (App. Div.),
certif denied, 121 N.J. 660, 583
A.2d 346 (1990).
38 See id. at 610, 568
A.2d at 910.
39 See id. at 613, 568
A.2d at 912.
40 54 N.J. Super. 205, 148 A.2d 634 (App. Div.
1959).
41 See id. at 213-14, 148
A.2d at 639.
42 72 N.J. Super. 572, 179 A.2d 49 (App. Div.), certif denied, 37 N.J.
229, 181 A.2d
12 (1962).
43 See id. at 579, 179 A.2d at
53.
See Feller, 54 N.J. Super. at 214, 148 A.2d at 639.
45 See Stuchin v. Kasirer, 237 N.J. Super. 604, 613-14, 568 A.2d 907, 912-13
(App.
Div.), certif. denied, 121 N.J. 660, 583 A.2d 346 (1990).
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should not be ignored by lenders whose loan documents are governed by New Jersey law. Lenders would be well advised to make an
assessment of the internal procedures that are triggered or invoked
as a result of a late payment. If guidelines do not currently exist for
the procedures to follow once a 'payment is delinquent, serious consideration should be given to developing written guidelines. Based
upon an assessment of those procedures and the costs entailed in
implementing them, a late charge should be established. If the internal administrative procedures and related costs warrant, the late
fee could be expressed as a per diem amount, on the theory that discrete action is taken daily until the delinquent payment is made. Alternately, the late charge provision could provide that the assessment
increases after the passage of a specified interval of time. For example, if a payment were between one and ten days late, one charge
would apply, while another charge would be applicable if a payment
were between eleven and twenty days late. In any event, the amount
of the charge and the basis for increasing it should be reasonably related to the types of administrative procedures and costs that come
into play once a payment is delinquent. Finally, it would be prudent
to cap the amount of the late charge that could accrue in any one instance, regardless of the number of days a payment is late.
Another option for lenders to consider is abandoning a late
charge and, instead, imposing a default waiver fee. Oftentimes, the
same delinquency that would render a payment subject to a late
charge would also constitute a default under the loan documents.
Rather than imposing a late fee, the lender could require the borrower to pay a fee in consideration for the lender waiving the default
and agreeing not to accelerate the loan. The process would be effected by means of a default waiver letter in which the borrower
agrees to pay the specified sum and releases all claims against the
lender up to and including the payment of that amount. It would be
difficult to conceive how a court could overturn the payment.
The MetLife decision provides little guidance to lenders regarding a default rate of interest. To overcome certain of the objections
raised by the court, a lender's loan documents should state that the
default rate of interest is a contractual rate of interest, albeit one that
applies from and after the occurrence of an event of default. The
lender could bolster its position further by requiring the borrower to
acknowledge in the note that the default rate is intended to compensate the lender for the risks presented by the loan being in default,
including the risk of non-payment. In the event a court were blindly
to apply the penalty analysis as did the MetLife court, a lender should
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be prepared to offer more compelling testimony than did MetLife's
expert about the types of costs resulting from loans going into default. Those costs may include the expense of having to increase reserves for bad loans and the cost of the lender's credit being downgraded by rating agencies. Lastly, opting for a 2% rather than a 3%
increase in the interest rate upon the occurrence of a default would
allow another court to distinguish MetLife and uphold the default
rate.
In dealing with both the late charge and the default rate provisions, full and early disclosure to the borrower is strongly recommended. Just as in the consumer context a credit card company discloses its finance charges and late payment fee in the application, so
should a commercial lender alert a prospective borrower to the nature of these charges at the commitment stage. If these charges or
fees are fully disclosed prior to the time that a borrower is obligated
to proceed with the loan, there is a greater likelihood that those provisions will withstand judicial scrutiny, on the basis that they were
bargained-for terms in a commercial transaction. Disclosure is helpful but cannot eliminate all of the uncertainty and risk posed by the
holding in MetLife.

